WebDeterministic Budget-Feasible Clock Auctions. In Joseph (Seffi) Naor , Niv Buchbinder , editors, Proceedings of the 2024 ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms, SODA … WebWe revisit the well-studied problem of budget-feasible procurement, where a buyer with a strict budget constraint seeks to acquire services from a group of strategic providers (the …
Xizhi Tan - Google Scholar
WebJul 5, 2015 · Deterministic Budget-Feasible Clock Auctions. Preprint. Jul 2024; Eric Balkanski; Pranav Garimidi; Vasilis Gkatzelis; Xizhi Tan; We revisit the well-studied problem of budget-feasible procurement ... WebJul 17, 2024 · We propose and analyze a budget-balanced and strategy-proof mechanism, the Weighted Minimum Surplus (WMS) auction, for the dynamic ridesharing problem with multiple passengers per ride. We also propose and analyze a budget-balanced version of the well-known VCG mechanism, the VCG_s. ... Deterministic Budget-Feasible Clock … incompatibility\\u0027s cs
A dynamic auction for multi-object procurement under a hard budget …
WebDeterministic Budget-Feasible Clock Auctions. E Balkanski, P Garimidi, V Gkatzelis, D Schoepflin, X Tan. 33rd Annual ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms (SODA 22), 2024. 4: 2024: Strategyproof Scheduling with Predictions. E Balkanski, V Gkatzelis, X Tan. WebFeb 1, 2014 · We propose a new open clock auction for this procurement problem. This auction is strategically simple, as it exhibits truthtelling in dominant strategies and satisfies ex-post rationality, while observing the budget constraint. ... Deterministic Budget-Feasible Clock Auctions. 2024, Proceedings of the Annual ACM-SIAM Symposium on … WebWe revisit the well-studied problem of budget-feasible procurement, where a buyer with a strict budget constraint seeks to acquire services from a group of strategic providers (the sellers). During the last decade, several strategyproof budget-feasible procurement auctions have been proposed, aiming to maximize the value of the buyer, while eliciting … incompatibility\\u0027s cu